connection advocated the development of a route from Santi Quaranta on the Adriatic, straight through to Monastir, and the improvement of railway communications down through Italy, so that supplies and reinforcements could be sent to Salonika overland, save for the short crossing of the Adriatic. Shipping would thus be economised, and the submarine menace to the Salonika communications immensely reduced.

Allied co-operation proposed on Italian Front

" 23. Leaving the Balkans, let us look at the Italian Front. Here there are two possible contingencies : one defensive, the other offensive. If the enemy should, as suggested above, concentrate his manoeuvre armies against the Italian front, it would afford a great opportunity for the Allies. Should the enemy adopt this course, the presumption is that he will gamble upon the stupidity and lack of mobility of the Allies. Unquestionably, he regards us as stupid and lacking in initiative. Let us take advantage of this amiable belief. The enemy will base the plan of attack on the assumption that he has to meet a force of so many Italian heavy guns, some of which he knows to be of old type, and lacking in mobility. If he elects to attack on this front, we propose that the Allies should concert their own plans, so that instead of meeting the artillery armament that he calculates for, he shall find himself confronted with a vastly superior

armament of Italian guns reinforced by British, and, we should hope, French artillery, with their own personnel.

We can put the Germans out of action just as well on the Italian as on the Western Front. By adopting this plan we might well convert a repulse into a rout, just as the Germans, by massing artillery